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I. Introduction
As I engaged in discussions on how to reduce air pollution in Mexico City with
technical experts and representatives  of the government of Mexico City, confidence in a
text-book approach  was shaken by several observations. One of these observations was
that the government examined in detail how classes of vehicles and fuels could be made
less polluting - or "cleaner". The textbook recommendation  of an arms-length approach -
an emission tax -was not only unpractical, but also not providing much guidance on
principles.
It struck me then that economists did not have a plausible model for why emission
standards and mandated technologies  play a dominant role in practice. I would later
become convinced that this blind spot in important ways have hampered our impact in
practice, even in conveying well-founded insights. There were a number of guidelines I
searched for, but did not find. Two important questions that I asked are explored in these
essays:
*  Should one stimulate emission reductions in the same way from firms and
households, rich and poor?
*  How should one combine instruments that make activities cleaner, with
instruments that shift the economy  towards less polluting activities?
Over the following years, I tried to contribute to practical advice under simplifying
assumptions, while at the same time trying to develop principles under more general
assumptions. The following essay reports on the lessons from this journey. As in the
chronology of my own work, I start with applied analysis made with restrictive,
simplifying assumptions. I then explore consequences of making less restrictive
assumptions to see whether there is broader support, more general principles. In the
subsequent essays, we go from quite general to more applied analysis. Eskeland 2000a
and 2000b present the general theoretical analysis,  while Eskeland, 1994 and Eskeland
and Fezioglu, 1997 are applications to the problem of air pollution control in Mexico
City. Thus, some readers may choose to skip Eskeland 2000a and 2000b, on
generalizations  of the assumptions under which the analysis  can be justified. The cost
effectiveness  analysis for Mexico City (Eskeland, 1994,  and Eskeland and Feyzioglu,3
1997) is performed under conditions of "no distortionary taxation" and "a representative
consumer", while Eskeland 2000a and 2000b, analyze under broader assumptions
whether the same or similar analysis would apply.
One theme in this work will be that simple concepts from partial equilibrium
analysis under first best have close parallels in general equilibrium  with costly funding
and redistribution, if one can assume that the tax structure is optimal. Another is that
environmental protection is more like a problem of public goods provision than has been
previously acknowledged. We see this as we introduce pollution abatement in the
traditional public finance model.
The reader will see that there were some simple guideposts yet to be erected -
principles to be highlighted -even though the literature in public finance and in
environmental economics was quite dense with sophisticated  principles.
II. Our platform
We shall highlight a few key building blocks in what we shall call the public
finance approach to environmental protection. The first is what Arthur Cecil Pigou
explained as a difference between private and social net product; Pigou used the
lighthouse as one of his examples. We shall use a very specific and stylized example
giving rise to such a difference; what professor Paul Samuelson  (1954) called collective
consumption goods. Later, the accepted term came to be pure public goods "which all
enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to
no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good" (Samuelson,
1954).2
We shall use air quality as our main example of a pure public good. We can all
understand how the air quality is there for everyone, though some may care more than
' I will continue in the active form, but switching here from I to we. We  reflects in part that I hope I reason
with the reader as we go along, in part recognition of what I have learned from those who have reasoned
with me, worked with me.
2 For the lighthouse example (later used by Ronald Coase), Pigou credits Sidgwick. Pigou also dwells on
discrepancies in returns due to tenance relationships,  showing awareness of: the role property rights; the
challenges in structuring property rights well; and the role of government  in this regard. Samuelson lets us
know that he - through discussions with Richard Musgrave -learns that the principle he lays out is not new,
but known. Victor  Norman familiarized Norwegian students of economics with pure public goods by
explaining "King services" as "superpublic  goods", each person enjoying  the King's services more the more
others enjoy them.4
others, and some may be exposed more than others. This example serves well also to
demonstrate  how a good is public, or "nonrivalrous",  in one end - where we breathe fresh
air and enjoy seeing the mountains - but "rivalrous"  in the other, providing end: As one
person or firm emits pollution, this subtraction from the public good must be
compensated by another's reduction in emissions - if everyone's enjoyment is not to be
reduced.
In the public finance approach to pollution control, environmental quality has
typically been presented as a pure public good. A pollution indicator, e, may appear as an
argument in a consumer h's utility function (i.e. in her preferences),
(1)  uk  =  u(xh,e),
where xh is a vector of quantities of private goods consumed  by h, thus bearing her
identity as a superscript,  while the pollution level (or the air quality level) is the same for
everyone. 3 This setup is used in Sandmo's seminal (1975) article "Optimal taxation in the
presence of externalities",  and it is used invariably in subsequent treatments, such as
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), and Cremer, Gahvari and Ladoux (1998). Among
others, Sandmo (1972) have analyzed collective factors of production, the analogy to
pure public goods represented by a nonrivalrous  input. Variations offered here are to
analyze collective factors of production in a setting of costly revenue generation, and to
allow environmental quality to be such a collective factor of production. This formulation
should not be confounded  with the typical depiction of the environment as a cost-
reducing recipient of waste, which is rivalrous. We rather think of examples such as the
tourism industry needing clean air, the brewer needing clean water, pharmacists needing
a gene pool and farmers needing good weather.
A second key building block is that those reducing the environmental quality
cannot readily be charged for their disservices, giving rise to externalities (equivalently:
those who contribute to environmental  quality cannot readily be compensated). 4 Since
pure public goods are enjoyed by everybody  to the exclusion of no-one, an exclusion
3 See, for instance Sandmo (1975). The essential element is not that the pollution level is the same to
everyone - a model characterized by Meade (1952) as atmnospheric  pollution. It is essential that the
pollution level experienced by one person is influenced not only by herself but also (or only) by others.
Often the approximation is used that the individual  polluter views the pollution level as independent of her
own emissions - a good approximation when the number of polluters is large.5
mechanism does not in the outset offer itself to mobilize funds - or authority -to modify
the actions of polluters. One perspective on government is a club that can weigh costs and
benefits in areas such as pollution control on behalf of members. Thus, govermment  can
take on the role of charging for the disservices - or by other means to rectify the incentive
problem. 5
An important representation in the public finance literature of how the
environmental good is provided is to describe pollution as proportional to output in a
polluting industryj or to a polluting consumption activity (Sandmo, 1975):
(2)  e = fj  hxh
The variation offered in the following shall be that polluters, or those who deliver
to polluting activities (say, gasoline refiners and car makers) may devote resources to
reduce those proportionality  factors  e  =  'h  fj  (aj,  bh )xj,  where  a1 and b] are resources
devoted to abatement of emissions for good j  by producers and by consumer h,
respectively. We shall see that one unexpected reward for this generalization is new
insights from parallels to the traditional problem of public goods provision.
The third key building block is government, represented by a benevolent planner
whose objectives  can be characterized  by an individualist  welfare function  in the
Bergson-Samuelson  tradition:
(3)  w = w(vI,.., vh).
In (3),  vh  = vh (qlIh  e)  is the indirect utility function corresponding  to (1) for individuals
1,..,h. The individuals are assumed to take as given a vector of consumer prices q, lump
sum private incomes Ih  (which may be zero), governnent revenue and the quality of the
environment. (3) embodies two statements about the objectives of the planner: he builds
on individual preferences, and can compare utility differences (utility is cardinal).
In the context of environmental protection, it may be important to highlight that
(3) is an anthropocentric framework.  On the one hand, there is no environmental
obligation - or moral code with regard to the environment -inserted in the model from the
4 The qualification  that the "disservices  to others" can not be charged for is due to Pigou (1932).
5 Such a club would suffer under free-riding problems and would not mobilize much willingness to pay for
the environment if membership were voluntary. This free-riding problem - being solved by compulsory6
outside. On the other hand, the framework  embodies individual preferences, not only
people's hunger to consume. It includes and aggregates what individuals find to be their
obligations and interests.
The fourth key building block is a government revenue requirement (or a set of
public expenditure opportunities) and a set of policy instruments. The policy instruments
may be insufficient to fund govermment  programs without resorting to distortionary
taxation. In our case, a contribution will be to show the role of emission taxes, and what
can be done by surrogate  instruments such as emission standards when an emission tax is
not available.
Apart from these building blocks for our models, important guideposts have been
erected  by prominent travelers. In the field of taxation, Frank Ramsey (1927) and Paul
Sarnuelson (1951) laid out how linear commodity  taxes should be used to raise revenue in
a way minimizing welfare costs. Pigou - who instigated Ramsey's analysis -conjectured
that government expenditures should be lower in the case when revenue generation is
costly than they would be otherwise (and made similar observations on distributional
grounds, as Sandmo, 1999, points out). Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Atkinson and Stern
(1974), King (1986) and others have helped analyze and qualify Pigou's conjecture,
providing insights and delineating exceptions. We shall show that this question is closely
related to one raised recently in the debate on "double dividends"  (Bovenberg and de
Mooij, 1994). Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972) provided
the conditions under which efficiency in aggregate  production is desirable even when the
government must resort to distortionary  revenue generation - findings of great relevance
for the current study.
In the areas more closely associated with environmental  protection and
externalities,  Ramsey (1927) noted that the task of revenue generation is distinct from the
need to charge for damage for corrective  purposes. Answering the challenge, Sandmo
(1975) was first to deduce optimal principles under the dual objectives of correcting for
externalities and mobilizing revenue. He concluded:  "even in a  world of distortionary
taxation... there is scope for taxing externality generating commodities according to the
membership -is equally serious whether citizens  have the right to a clean environment  - or polluters have
the right to pollute. For an elaboration  on this point, see Eskeland and Devarajan (1996).7
Pigovian principle." The optimal tax structure is characterized  by an "additivity
property", where the revenue motivated terms apply to all commodities in a well-known
fashion, and the term motivated by the need to correct the externality applies only to the
tax on the polluting good. Among his findings was that the need for distortionary revenue
generation in itself does not introduce reference to complements or substitutes to the
polluting goods in the corrective part of his tax formula. 6
We are now ready to introduce our applied analysis into this general framework,
first by making very restrictive assumptions. In section IV, we visit the more general
theoretical model. This gives us a chance to check whether the applied analysis is given
support under more general assumptions, and also to extend the theoretical framework.
III.  A presumptive Pigovian tax: to balance "cleaner"  with "less"
Emission standards should be matched with commodity taxes
Drawing from Eskeland 1994 (which provides more detail), let us think about the
problem in terms of a representative consumer and a government able to make lump-sum
transfers, so there is no need to resort to distortionary revenue generation. Thus
intervention to facilitate provision of the public good - environmental quality -is the only
rationale for government intervention. Let us further think of environmental quality, or
the absence of pollution, as a pure public good in the Samuelsonian sense of nonrivalry in
consumption. Finally, let us assume that individual emissions, e, from a polluting activity
- say driving  - is determined by  a technology  parameter  called abatement, a (say - the
emission control equipment in the vehicle), and the scale of the activity, x, measured for
instance by vehicle miles traveled or by gasoline consumption.
We simplify further  by assuming only two private goods, so we can let c=c(x,a)
represent the cost of the quantity x and abatement a in terms of the other private good.
We let e=e(x,  a) take the place of (2); a generalization since we do not restrict attention to
costs and emissions that are proportional to consumption (c=c(a)x; e=e(a)x)). A cost
6 As Sandmo carefully points out ("our conclusion is no more than a statement about the terns  in the
formula"), the apparent additivity in the formula  implies no independence  between the environmental tax
and the other taxes. This is not only because the shadow price of public revenue is a part of the corrective
tax term, but also because all parameters in the formulas are functions of the tax structure.8
effective pollution control program now can be found by maximizing u(x,-c(x  a))
subject to e(x, a)=  . The first order conditions  for optimum reduce to:
(4)  ~~Ux'  I  Uy  -Cx  _Ca
e.-,  ea
The right hand side is the marginal cost of emission reductions through abatement.
Relative to a unit of the other good a cost effective program requires a wedge between the
marginal utility and the marginal cost of x which - per unit of marginal emissions - is
equal to  - ca lea  -
As is readily known - and easily checked  - an emission tax equal to the
Samuelsonian sum over consumers of the marginal rates of substitution between the
public good and the numeraire good can implement the optimal solution. Such a tax
satisfies (4), optimally combining inducement to abatement and reduction of demand for
the polluting good. Furthermore, an emission tax at any other rate will implement cost
effective environmental  protection (4), meaning that the pollution reductions that are
attained come at minimal costs, even if the reductions are not optimal.
An instrument that is equivalent to the emission tax in models with lump sum
transfers is an exogenous quota for emissions. With multiple polluters, individual quotas
will also have this property, if their allocation is exogenous and they are tradable. In
contrast, individual emission quotas will typically result in some flaw in the incentive
framework if their allocation is not exogenous. The allocation mechanism we shall focus
on here is one in which the emission quota is given in association with some output
choice (or input choice). One design frequently observed in practice is an emission
standard, as when cars are allowed a maximum of 9 grams of carbon monoxide (CO) per
mile driven (Harrington, 1997). Another one, with similar implications, is an abatement
standard, as when cars are required to come with a catalytic converter. Quite intuitively,
now, pollution reductions stimulated by an abatement standard (or an emission standard)
alone will not achieve cost effective pollution control, since the standard awards emission
quotas conditional on expanding output. For cars, an emission standard alone may or may
not increase the marginal cost of driving, but will at any rate not discourage driving in the
way commanded by a cost effective  program (4). Polluters could be made better off if
allowed to do less abatement, compensating  by reducing the scale of the polluting activity9
so as to leave total emissions unchanged. Similarly, an output tax alone will compress
activity too much, ignoring low-cost technological abatement opportunities.
Public finance models have often made the simplifying assumption that emissions
are determined by aggregate output alone, thus abstracting from the option of polluter
abatement, making each unit of output less polluting. 7 Another consequence of such a
modeling assumption is to make redundant the distinction  between a corrective tax levied
on emissions themselves and a corrective tax levied on the output of the polluting
activity. In our context this distinction is important, and we use the term presumptive
Pigovian tax when the corrective instrument is levied not on emissions but on an input or
an output (say gasoline) in presumption of emissions. 8
Observing that emission regulations typically apply to emission factors (grams
emitted per mile driven, per ton of paper produced), the proposition that these empirically
observed instruments should be accompanied  by presumptive Pigovian taxes was made in
"A presumptive Pigovian tax: Complementing  regulation to mimic an emissions fee"
(Eskeland, 1994). This is an alternative  way of implementing  the condition stated in (4),
and is then given a practical illustration. The analysis of pollution control options for
vehicular emissions in Mexico City allows us to focus on the dichotomy between
"cleaner cars" and "fewer trips". The principle is spelled out in terms of a simple rule for
cost effectiveness,  to separate the message from the discussion of environmental benefits.
The rule for how an optimal "matching gasoline tax" depends on the standard for
abatement, a,  or the emission standard (equivalent, given our assumptions) is
(5)  tca  (x-=
e, (x, a)  ea
Thus, when the two instruments "match" each other to implement pollution reductions
cost effectively, the corrective tax on gasoline,  per gram of emission, is equal to the
marginal cost of emission reductions through abatement. If we include another polluting
7 Examples are Sandmo (1975), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994),
Cremer, Gahvari, Ladoux (1998). Diamond (1973), Sandmo (1976), Balcer (1980), and Wijkander (1985)
focus on Pigovian taxes levied on goods that are itnperfect as tax bases from the perspective of correcting
the externality, using taxes and subsidies on associated goods as remedies for the imperfection.
S The term "presumptive"  stands for a presumed  relation to emissions, drawing on how the term is used in
for instance  presumptive income taxes. See Eskeland (1994), Eskeland and Devarajan (1996). Fullerton and
Wolverton (1999) use the term in a similar way. Innes (1996), as well, proposes such an instrument to
complement regulation in the context of polluting vehicles and fuels.10
good, a corresponding  formula applies for that good, and in addition it is required that the
costs of emission reductions are the same across polluting goods.
The tax, quoted  by the left hand side of (5) per unit of emissions, is translated to a
tax rate per unit of the polluting good by multiplying both sides of (5) by the emission
factor,  e (x, a) .The resulting formula -a tax proportional to the polluting good's
emission factor - is equivalent to Sandmo's (1975) formula in the case when the pollution
reductions attained are optimal and lump sum transfers are available.
A positive theory of emission standards
It is puzzling to us that the principle of a presumptive tax on outputs to
complement emission standards (5) has not - to our knowledge -been highlighted in the
rich literature on environmental economics. Reasonable economists probably find the
proposition unsurprising, but we shall dwell a little on why the correspondence  in a cost
effective program between emission standards and output reductions has not been
highlighted.
It is possible to reason that if monitoring costs make emission taxes unworkable,
then emission standards also cannot work. It is harder, however, to argue that a regime of
emission standards cannot be complemented  by commodity taxes in presumptions of
emission (the emissions that are presumed to remain after abatement, that is). We shall
argue that there are some practically important observations  that economists failed to
make which allowed them -or us - to miss the point that emission standards should be
accompanied  by output taxation. 9 These omissions were related to a lack of adequate
positive models for emission standards -we did not understand sufficiently  why the
standards were out there in the first place.'0
9 For a thorough  review of the literature an environmental  economics, see Cropper and Oates, 1992.  In
public finance, see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980. 3aumol  and Oates (1988) in the chapter "Efficiency
without Optimality:  the charges and standards approach" develop cost effectiveness criteria. They note that
standards are "somewhat arbitrary", omitting to mention, let alone model, that standards award quotas
proportional to input or output. Eskeland and Jirnenez (1992), in a review of instruments, also failed to
make this observation. Recently, hnnes  (1996) recommends combinations  of standards and fuel taxes, and
Fullerton and Wolverton (1999) have adopted the term presumptive Pigovian taxes to highlight
combinations  of taxes on gasoline and instruments  applied to emission factors or vehicle characteristics.
'  Buchanan and Tullock (1975) provides a plausible positive model for regulation (in effect, for standards),
and later authors have in the same vein seen standards as a way of distributing property rights to the
enviromnent. However, these models are rendered powerless in the context of more general policy design11
The first omitted observation  is that the emission quotas allocated by an emission
standard empirically take the shape of conditional  property rights. Theoretically, such a
conditionality - a quota if you drive a mile - can result from a particular structure for the
costs of monitoring, enforcing and delivering reductions emissions. However, while
economists had dealt with costly monitoring and enforcement (examples are Sandmo,
1976; Schmutzler and Goulder, 1997; Magat and Viscusi, 1990), they had not dealt with
the possibility that plausible cost structures for monitoring would yield policy
instruments applied to intermediate  measures such as emission factors. We elaborate on
this in Eskeland (1994) and in Eskeland and Devarajan (1996), but our simple contention
is that quota allocation takes the shape of a regulation applied to emission factors because
an emission factor is monitored at a lower cost than is an individual's cumulative
emissions. An important part of this is - in the case of cars - that it is easier to associate
emissions with a car than with a person. Cumulative emissions can then be addressed by
the policy indirectly, as the policy maker imagines - or models -how the scale of the
polluting activity is determined.  For cars, the emission  standard is typically a quota for
emissions which expands for each mile driven (Harrington 1997), thus representing an
implicit subsidy to driving. This does not imply that emission reductions become elusive,
but it means that the emission reductions sought with emission standards alone could be
attained at a lower cost.
The second, related observation is also both a theoretical one and a practical one:
Theoretically, the proposition that allowing trade in quotas can lead only to efficiency
gains no longer holds when quotas are allocated conditionally on behavior. The reason is
that the allowance of trades will influence the behavior determining the allocation of
quotas.  1l  Practically speaking, if driving an old Buick in California gives you an
in which instruments include compensating  transfers (In the Mexico context, such a broader design context
appeared relevant: unions accepted gasoline price increases comnpensated  by reductions in general sales
taxes). Moreover, as a positive theory, these models fail to explain why the pollution quotas, once
distributed, rarely are considered tradeable. Another important debate came about on the relative merits of
intervening with instruments of "price" or "quantity" (See Weitzman, 1974; Roberts and Spence, 1976;
Baumol and Oates, 1988),  where the relevant arguments concerned aggregate uncertainty. This perspective,
however, still yielded the verdict that the quantity instrument should be tradeable, thus retaining the cost
effectiveness properties of the analogous price instrument.
' An illustration of this is as follows: if restaurant seats are allocated on a first come first serve basis, a
norm that a given position in a line is nontradeable may appear to obstruct efficiency enhancing trades.
"Removing" the norm could, however, make people line up with no intention to be seated. "Races for12
emission quota of 9 grams of CO per mile driven (Harrington, 1997), delinking the quota
from the car and/or from driving would require an alternative  institutional machinery;
fundamentally changing the nature of the emission quota. 12
Economists  have - and often rightly - been harsh in their criticism  of emission
standards and regulatory approaches to pollution control (Baumol and Oates, 1988;
Tietenberg, 1992). Perhaps because of the attention demanded to make those points, the
statement on how standards should be accompanied  by output taxes (5) has to this
author's present knowledge not been made before the appearance of the 1994 article.
Demand management in pollution control: Is it important?
Pollution control agencies typically have regulated polluting activities, and typically to
make them less polluting per unit of output or input.' 3 In the public finance literature, in
contrast, shifting the balance of the economy towards less polluting goods and sectors has
been emphasized. Two reasons come to mind for this latter emphasis: First, shifting the
balance between activities fits easily in a traditional modeling framework. Second,
economists have had an important message, given the overly restricted focus on
abatement - or ways to make each activity less polluting - in policy-making bodies. In
terms of applied studies, several authors have analyzed the responsiveness of an economy
to environmental  policies - either simply considering effects on measured income or to
include effects on pollution as well.1 4 Most such studies - when they include pollution
implications, concentrate on greenhouse gas emissions, for which it is fairly accurate to
model emissions as strictly proportional to fuel consumption,  i.e. without abatement
options. As such, these studies benefited greatly from an earlier wave of applied studies
in energy demand, fueled by the 1973 energy crisis (Pindyck, 1979; Fuss 1977).
property rights", "tragedies of the commons" and "overfishing" all can be seen as consequences of
conditional property rights.
2 Buyback  programs can be seen as introducing an opportunity  for a car owner to sell the remaining
"emission quotas" represented by her car by scrapping it. It should  be tried only for exceptional cars, of
course (and typically is: see Alberini et al., 1995) since for the representative  car the program would be
reducing pollution only if driving up the price of cars - a job better done by tax instruments.
3 Apart from the automobile examples (Harrington, 1997;  Eskeland, 1994), see Magat and Viscusi (1990).
'4 Examples are Hazilla and Kopp (1990); Goulder et al. (1999); Konrad and Schroder (1991); Glomsrod,
Johnsen and Vennemo (1992); Whalley and Wigle (1998); Jorgenson  and Wilcoxen (1993); Eskeland,
Jimenez and Liu (1998); Eskeland and Devarajan (1996); Alfsen (1992).13
Eskeland (1994) gives a detailed examination of control options and implications
for emission factors, with a total of 28 measures being "admitted" to the control cost
curve. 
15 In other areas, the model is very simple: a representative consumer, no other
taxes or tax reasons, and a general equilibrium framework  with three goods: car travel, air
quality, and other goods and services. Using the best available estimated demand function
for gasoline (Berndt and Botero, 1985),  the matching gasoline tax shifted the control cost
curve down by a significant amount (figure 1).
Figure 1.
Program to Reduce Air Pollution Emissions  from Transport in Mexico City, with and
without a Gasoline Tax
Marginal  cost of emission  reductions
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Note:  Calculations  are based on -0.8 elasticity  of demand for gasoline. Eskeland,  1994.
15 Several aspects additional  to the "matching tax" result were novel: Multiple pollutants were weighed
with a benefit-based metric; a cost-minimizing  control cost curve was constructed. In a companion study,
the proposition of a market based demand management was supplemented  with a quantitative evaluation of
an existing rationing scheme for driving (Eskeland and Feyzioglu, 1997b).14
The conclusion was that a well-composed  program of "cleaner cars" would cost 24
percent more if restricted not to include a gasoline tax in the tool chest. In terms of annual
US dollars, the difference  was $111 million, or $6 per citizen, much more per car. The
proposed strategy, using (5), minimizes the welfare cost of emission reductions by
viewing "cleaner cars" and "fewer trips" as competing  providers of emission reductions.
In "Is demand for polluting goods manageable?  An econometric study of car
ownership and use in Mexico", Eskeland and Feyzioglu (1997) make an effort to obtain
more suitable estimates for the demand function. Using richer and more recent data, and
techniques capable of addressing additional challenges, the estimated model resulted with
a price elasticity for gasoline consumption of -1.3 to -1.1, as opposed to the original -.8
from Bemdt and Botero (1985). With those results, the estimated additional cost of
excluding the demand management instrument increased to 44 percent.
Our conclusion from this analysis is that demand management belongs in
environmental protection not only as a matter of principle, but such as to make a
significant difference  quantitatively. It was interesting  to have this demonstrated in a field
such as automotive emissions, since it is important empirically  in the world's pollution
problems. Also, the field of automotive emissions combines technical controls that are
quite powerful in terms of reducing emission factors with a pessimism amongst many
about the manageability of demand. We made similarly encouraging findings on air
pollutant emissions (Sulfur oxides, particles, others) when we estimated input demand
functions from manufacturing  industries in Chile and Indonesia (Eskeland, Jimenez and
Liu, 1998). The estimated elasticities of different pollutant emissions with respect to the
price of heavy fuels (combining differences in emission coefficients with own- and cross
price elasticities) resulted in the range of -.4 to -1.3, so a forty percent price increase
could reduce emissions by twenty to fifty percent.
We now turn to the more involved theoretical  analysis, with the motivation to see
whether the simple principles demonstrated  above apply under more general
assumptions, in particular regarding costly revenue generation.15
IV.  Provision of environmental quality when revenue  generation is costly
An insight from the theory of the second best is that with one distortion given in
the economy, it may be attractive  to have others as well. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986)
forcefully demonstrated  the implications when showing  how imperfections of one policy
instrument with regard to one market failure leaves it attractive  to look across all
instruments for compensating  remedies.
In the light of that challenge, one may ask under what conditions the intuition is
still correct, that the planner should use one price to induce emission reductions? Do the
challenges of distortionary revenue generation and costly redistribution imply that the
provision of the environmental good departs from simple efficiency principles? If it does,
will it influence the cost effectiveness analysis and the control cost curve? Also, what
does it take for us to categorize an environmental  policy instrument as imperfect, in the
sense that it should be combined with other instruments to protect the environment?
Externalities and production efficiency
Setting aside, for the moment, the question of how much pollution control (i.e. pollution)
there should be, an important question is whether provision of pollution reductions
should be efficient in the sense that the marginal rates of transformation  between
abatement and emission reductions are equalized. 16
The question of whether the marginal cost of emission reductions shall be the
same for different polluting activities (or ways to reduce emissions) is not asked in
studies such as Sandmo (1975) and Cremer et al. (1998). These models include only one
polluting good, and an aggregate  demand reduction is the only way to reduce emissions.
We introduce multiple polluting activities and resources devoted to pollution abatement
(reducing emission coefficients).  Furthermore, abatement can be done by producers to
reduce emissions in production, or by producers and consumers and government to
reduce emissions in consumption, so we can ask the question of equality in rates of
transformation across many dividing lines.
16 The equalization of marginal costs of emission  reductions through abatement is a concept of efficiency
corresponding to what is called "cost effectiveness" in the environmental economics literature (see, for
instance, Baumol and Oates, 1988;  Tietenberg, 1992). The more cumbersome term (marginal rates of
transformation  ...) is required when the comparison is across agents that may face different prices, as here.16
The answer to the question of efficiency in provision of the environmental good is
a quite affirmative yes (Eskeland, 2000a). The analysis is set under the following general
assumptions:  constant returns to scale; the environmental good is separable from other
goods; within each activity consumers have uniform emission functions; linear taxes on
inputs, outputs and emissions can be differentiated  by commodity (or emission standards
can be differentiated  by commodity); different regimes can apply for the three sets:
producers, government and the h consumers. We should notice that the assumption of
constant returns to scale is more restrictive than in the previous section, since c(a,x) and
e(a,x) here must be of the form c(a)x and e(a)x. The assumption  of constant  returns to
scale plays a quite central (though not indispensable) role for traditional results on
production efficiency in optimal taxation, and plays an equivalent role as we analyze their
applicability in the context of externalities.
Under these assumptions, a first result is that in optimum the marginal rates of
transformation  between abatement and emission  reductions are equal across polluting
activities (i.e. goods, sectors,j eN), and equal for consumers, producers and government.
One implication  of this is that, when asking how much one should do to make a vehicle
less polluting, one need not ask whether it is used by rich or poor, by households,
producers or government, by the health ministry or the military.
It is implicit in Diamond and Mirrlees' (1971) result on production efficiency that
the marginal rates of transformation between abatement and emission reductions shall be
equal for entities within industries and government.  We have simply included an
additional good as relevant to consumers, and the result that efficiency in aggregate
production should apply to this expanded vector of outputs is not surprising. Cremer and
Gahvari (1999) also find that marginal costs of emission reductions are equal in optimum
for firms with homogenous technologies,  but do not place this finding in the context of
the theorem on aggregate production efficiency.  The part of our production efficiency
result that was more unexpected was that polluting consumers, too, should abate to
provide emission reductions at the same marginal rates of transformation.
These findings provide considerable  relief in terms of implementation. First, if
pollution reductions can be stimulated  with emission taxes and abatement is untaxed,
then optimal abatement can be implemented  by the same tax levied on emissions17
everywhere where they occur. This holds independently  of whether the polluter is a
producer, consumer or government, commuting to work or mowing the lawn. It also
holds whether the abatement opportunities arise where emissions occur or at a prior stage,
as when a car's emission factor can be reduced by the manufacturer. The intuition, here,
is that auto makers and consumers who are exposed to an emission tax will work - as if
together - to minimize the all-inclusive unit cost, which includes emission taxes and
abatement costs at any stage.
The results are relieving also in terms of analytical simplicity. If emissions are
taxed uniformly, then the formula for commodity  taxes is identical to the one for optimal
commodity taxes in the traditional problem without external effects. Thus, the emission
tax that induces optimal abatement also induces the substitution  desired towards less
polluting goods, so that the formulas for optimal commodity  taxes bears no evidence of
the environmental problem. The formula for the emission tax, similarly, bears no
evidence of the revenue generation problem, apart from through the shadow price of
public funds (see below).
A second result of the listed assumptions is that if emission taxes cannot be used,
then Sandmo's (1975) formula for commodity taxes that includes a term for presumptive
Pigovian taxation applies. The presumptive Pigovian terms are proportional to the good's
emission factor, thus uniform per unit of emissions across polluting goods. This latter
result holds for any given emission factors, including when emission standards are being
used to reduce emission factors. If standards can be used in combination with
presumptive Pigovian taxes, then (5) is equalized across goods, and the same allocation
as under emission taxation is implemented.
These results thus give support -conditional on the assumptions - to the intuition
that environmental protection is much like a procurement problem -we should think of
the emission tax more like a producer price than as a tax. The principle that procurement
should equalize the marginal costs across potential providers is not shaken by the fact that
this good is provided as a negative externality, by government, firms, and consumers;
rich and poor. Thus, we find support for the cost-effectiveness  analysis under more
general assumptions than those originally invoked.18
We shall highlight here one particular aspect that we believe may be surprising to
some - hoping to assist intuition. In the Mexico City analysis, we looked across vehicle
types (e.g. buses, luxury cars) and applied a representative consumer  model. In Eskeland,
2000a, we obtain support for this equal treatment of different vehicles, even under costly
taxation and redistribution. Why does the planner not differentiate emission taxes (or
standards) across different vehicles for redistributive  reasons, for instance to let the rich
do more for the environment than the poor? The answer is simple, and shows the close
links to the traditional result on aggregate  production efficiency.  The planner is assumed
to have commodity specific commodity taxes available. These can be used to pursue the
redistribution that is feasible by changing relative consumer prices, without the additional
resource cost of reallocating abatement efforts in an inefficient pattern.
The production efficiency result does not apply if consumers are heterogenous in
their access to pollution abatement possibilities. If consumers differ in access to (i.e.
effectiveness  of) abatement, consumers exposed to the same emission tax may have
different emission factors for the same good. 17 As a consequence, the combination of an
emission tax and a commodity  tax confronts consumers of the same good with different
unit costs, giving the planner an instrument possibly attractive for redistribution. The case
of different emission factors also gives the planner a chance to price differentiate  to
reduce the costs of taxation. These results are presented in section IV of Eskeland 2000a.
Many of them are analogous to findings in the literature on imperfect corrective pricing
(starting with Diamond, 1973),  which prove to translate quite intuitively to a context of
distortionary revenue generation.
Pigou's conjecture about public expenditures, and the double dividend
We have employed the assumption  typically used, that there is separability in preferences
between the environmental good and market goods, so that uncompensated  demand for
market goods x'  (q,Ih  ,e)  is not influenced  by changes in pollution, Xje  = 0,  j  = 1,..,  n .
This yields a rule equivalent to the established one for optimal provision of public goods
17 The  same good here has a particular meaning: consumption  that cannot be differentiated in the
commodity  tax structure (Eskeland 2000a, section IV).19
(e.g. Atkinson and Stern, 1974; Auerbach, 1985; King, 1986), or with h identical
consumers
(6)  - I  = ha  ,all  j=l,..,n.
On the left hand side we have the marginal rate of transformation  between emission
reductions and abatement in sectorj, whether abatement is by producer or by consumer
(see the generalization indicated for equation 2). On the right hand side, ha  is aggregate
marginal willingness to pay for the public good (i.e. for pollution reductions), and f8/,
is the ratio between the marginal utility of income to the consumer, fi, and the shadow
price of the government's  budget constraint, ,u. In the context of an environmental
program, (6) can be implemented either by an emission  tax or by an emission standard.
An emission tax will be combined with commodity tax rates satisfying the formulas for
optimal taxes in the traditional problem without externalities,  while emission standards
will be combined with commodity taxes satisfying a generalized Sandmo (1975) formula,
including presumptive Pigovian terms (see Eskeland 2000a).
The generalization  under non-separability again results in a rule equivalent to the
one for optimal provision of public goods (King, 1986). The formulas for the optimal
commodity taxes are unchanged, but the optimality formula characterizing optimal
provision of environmental quality (6) in the case of two taxed goods changes to:18
(7)  - -=  ha  8-  6  =  tiXie, j=l ,..,n.
fib  P  =,
In other words, provision of the public good, minus e, is adjusted as if it were credited
with contributions that the public good makes to the proceeds from commodity taxes.
This equivalence  between the traditional problem of public goods provision and
environmental protection (equations 6 and 7) has not formerly  been highlighted, since
models of environmental externalities without abatement render no expressions
corresponding  the left hand sides, the marginal rate of transformation.
Pigou conjectured that costly revenue generation reduces public programs (see
Eskeland, 2000b). We shall see that one of the questions raised in the double dividend
18  See annex to Eskeland 2000b.20
debate is a question addressed by Pigou's conjecture,  well sorted out by Atkinson and
Stem (1974) for the case of pure public goods.
The first factor that may cause Pigou's conjecture to be turned around is if
nonseparability results in a positive marginal contribution from provision to the tax base
(in our case that - litixi,  > 0, so that emissions reduce demand for taxed goods). More
than a curiosity, this term is worth noticing in the present context for several reasons.
First in environmental economics, benefit estimation  methods such as hedonic price
models, wage-amenity studies and the travel cost method are based on the assumption
that willingness to pay for environmental quality is reflected in market prices and
behavior (see, for instance, Cropper and Oates, 1992, for a review). Second, in particular
in the context of tax jurisdictions competing for highly mobile factors (residents), the tax
interaction terms make possible the case that some environmental protection (or other
public goods provision) can be justified on the narrow grounds that it contributes to
revenues. 19 Third, in a developing country setting, the scope for providing public goods
that stimulate participation in the taxable economy may be significant.
The second factor that may invalidate Pigou's conjecture is ,/J,u (the inverse of
the marginal cost of funds). 20 ,3/eu  can be expected  to be less than one - in support of
Pigou's conjecture -but may be larger than one if the taxed goods on average are inferior
goods in the sense that Xtix3,  <0.  Then, the income effects from taxation cause
consumers to shift demand so as to reduce the costs of funds.
We shall proceed with a few additional assumptions, to comment upon results in
the so-called double dividend literature. The question examined  is whether -in the
context of costly revenue generation  - the emission tax rate be set at a level higher than
the first best rule (i.e. r,  = Aha,  where r, the emission-presumptive  rate on good 1, f,
the emission factor). Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) assume that wage income is used to
purchase a clean and a dirty good and that a wage tax is the revenue instrument.
'9 Tiebout's (1956) equilibrium in local public goods postulates efficient provision  without a benevolent
planner based solely on the non-separability  terms; In Tiebout's model, landowners cum government have a
revenue base capable  of capturing all benefits.
20 With heterogenous consumers, as Sandmo 1999  points out, the covariance between the vector ,6  and the
household consumption of taxed goods likely irnplies a tendency that redistributive considerations  raise
provision.21
Moreover, there is separability in preferences between other market goods and leisure,
and separability again between this aggregate  and environmental quality (so 2  jtjxj 1 = 0).
They then define as "Pigovian"  the first best tax for the dirty good r,  = f,ha,  to ask
whether welfare would be improved by moving in a revenue neutral fashion to increase
this tax or to decrease it. For a marginal reduction in the tax on the dirty good they find
that the answer hinges upon whether labor supply will increase or decrease as a (broader)
labor tax is reduced to substitute for a narrower tax on the dirty good. They show that the
tax on the dirty good will be lower than the "first best" level under the assumption that
labor supply is not in a backward-bending  region. They then argue that an upward-
sloping labor supply is to be assumed based on empirical studies.
We may use or own framework and an additional restrictive assumption to
analyze this problem in optimum. Our result that the optimum Pigovian tax can be
characterized in the presence of commodity taxes that satisfy the optimality conditions
for the traditional, non-environmental  tax problem is useful for this. For a tax on labor
only to be optimal from a non-environmental  perspective, we need to restrict preferences
for the subaggregate of market goods, 1 and 2 to be homothetic (Sandmo, 1974). We can
then bring with us from (6) above that marginal costs of abatement can be greater than
the benefits if and only if /,u/u is greater than one, and proceed to check under what
conditions this can be the case.
The first order condition for the optimal labor tax for the traditional non-
environmental problem is
(8)  A=  t  aL
pu  LOw
where L is labor (endowment minus leisure) and t is the tax on labor income. 21 Labor
productivity is a constant, so aL/ow = -dL/dt  . For the optimal tax problem which
includes pollution, we know that (8) should be satisfied together with
(9)  r,=fiha
21 Rearranging,  1/s = 1- (t / W)6eW, so the cost  of funds,  /I,8,  increases  in the labor  supply
elasticity, ELw, and in the tax level.22
for the tax on the polluting good. From (9), we know that z, >  fiha  <=>  /1/p > 1. From
(8), assuming a revenue requirement beyond r1x1, so that t>O,  we confirm the result that
the marginal costs in optimum cannot be greater than benefits ha  unless if the
uncompensated  labor supply curve is backward bending, aL/&w  < 0 (i.e. unless if the
income effect of a wage increase dominates over the substitution effect). However, the
labor supply curve can be backwardbending only in a region for which proceeds from the
labor tax are declining in t. The optimal labor tax rate is not found in such a region under
our preference assumptions (since substitution from labor towards leisure means away
from "dirty"). Thus, we may rule out on theoretical  grounds the possibility that in
optimum the environmental tax be set at a level higher than what the first-best parameters
indicate, f  ha .We may say that under these assumptions Pigou's conjecture applies and
rejects the proposition that the environmental  tax be set at higher levels than the benefits
of pollution reduction.
When a public good such as the environment benefits  production
In Eskeland 2000b, we make the variation that environmental quality also benefits
production by reducing production costs, in addition to the pure public good benefiting
consumers directly. Examples may be the brewer whose costs are lower when his water
source is unpolluted, or the tourism industry that needs good air quality. We retain the
assumption of constant returns to scale, so the benefits in terms of cost savings are not
accruing to firms or their owners, but are passed on to consumers if they are not captured
by government in the form of taxation. The rule for optimal provision corresponding  to
(6), written to accommodate  heterogenous consumers and costly redistribution, is:
(10)  - A  + Ejz(hx  j+  x,  )cje-
fib  P
In (10), Cje  is the marginal increase in unit costs of good j  as pollution increases and
hxj + xj  is the total consumption of j  by the h consumers and government. For a
program which only has benefits in production, of course, the first sum in (9) is zero.
Comparing (9) with (6), we can see that the generalization  is in the spirit of a generalized
Samuelsonian summation of marginal  benefits, the benefits of reduced production costs23
now added to the more familiar summation of benefits based directly on preferences (1).
Interestingly, though, the benefits that originate in production costs are not "adjusted"
with  l/,u, the ratio of the marginal utility of income to the shadow  price of public
revenue. Thus, we conclude, public provision with benefits in production rather than as
public goods (equation 1) defies Pigou's conjecture  - and the double dividend debate - all
together. Put in a different way, while Samuelson's  (1954) rule for optimal provision of
public goods applies only with adjustmnents  in the context of costly revenue generation,
the analogous rule for provision of collective  factors of production (see Sandmo, 1972)
applies directly even when revenue generation is costly.
This result, too, serves well to illustrate the links to Diamond and Mirrlees' result
on efficiency in aggregate  production. (10) is written in a form valid also with
heterogenous consumers, and one might ask again why one should not value cost
reductions differently according to who consumes the goods that benefit from a better
environment. Again, the answer is that the social planner is assumed to have policy
instruments with which consumer  prices can be changed with specificity for each good.
Thus, it is not attractive to make inefficient (for revenue or redistributive reasons) a
program that saves costs for producers.
There is also a parallel to our case of nonseparability.  In (7), we show how an
adjustment to the rule for optimal provision occurs if provision interacts  with the tax
base. In (9), for the cost reductions to industries, interaction with the tax base is the whole
story. Cost reductions to industries can be captured in their entirety without distortionary
costs, by matching them with tax increases for the benefiting goods, so as to leave the all-
inclusive consumer price unchanged. It is indeed another result implicit in Diamond and
Mirrlees' (1971) analysis that public provision which benefits production should be
subject to aggregate  production efficiency, in this case meaning that the benefits be
accounted for fully. For consumer  provision in contrast, as with consumer abatement, the
result is not hinted at by earlier findings.
Qualified by the assumptions, the findings have direct policy implications. To
illustrate, if a road maintenance project were to save vehicle operators a dollar per
passage, one might suggest to count the benefits as 50 cents with reference to the high
distortionary costs of funding public budgets. The present analysis indicates that no such24
adjustment should apply for the share of vehicles that are commercial or of government.22
Finally, we should emphasize  that it would be wrong to construe this principle as
reflecting a judgment that production is more important than consumption; only
consumption and consumer preferences matter in this model. Rather, it reflects
assumptions implying that benefits accruing in production are easily taxable.
V. Conclusion
We have tried to summarize  the lessons from a journey that included policy
recommendations in a practical setting as well as development of policy principles.
Working in an applied setting provides good discipline, helping not only to communicate
principles better, but also to go back to the theory with reformulated questions.
It sounds odd to many theoreticians that economists  had omitted to make the
recommendation  that a pollution control program emphasizing  emission standards and
"cleaner  technologies" should be complemented  by presumptive Pigovian taxes - to shift
the economy towards "fewer polluting trips" as well. As we emphasized that this is a
good principle in theory and also implementable in practice, we also quantified important
aspects of demand management. First, we used results from technical studies to compute
a marginal cost curve for emission reductions in the form of "cleaner cars and fuels".
Then, we estimated a demand model for cars and driving and used our rule for a
matching tax to combine these two instruments in a cost effective way. The result
indicates that the cost of pollution reductions in Mexico City increases by 44 percent if a
program of emission standards and a presumptive Pigovian tax on gasoline is restricted to
not employ the gasoline tax.
These results come about under the assumption  that revenue and redistributive
transfers bear no premia. Our subsequent  theoretical analysis indicates that this approach
to policy analysis is supported under a plausible set of more general assumptions. A
positive shadow price of revenue influences the optimal environmental quality, and
would typically reduce it (as in Pigou's conjecture for public expenditures). However,
neither the shadow price of revenue nor redistributive considerations  would change the
shape of the program, since commodity taxes are assumed to be available, and they are
22 Christiansen (1981) shows that benefits to a household, when they are represented by savings in terns  of25
better suited for redistribution and revenue generation  than is a modification of a cost
effective emission reduction program.
The qualifications to these generalizations  are -roughly - the assumptions that
support the recommendation of efficiency in aggregate production (Diamond and
Mirrlees, 1971).  Under these conditions, we find that firms, consumers and governments
should be pushed in the same way, and equally hard, to reduce emissions, i.e. so that
marginal costs of emission reductions are the same. Marginal costs of emission
reductions shall also be the same across different polluting activities, or goods.
When abatement is untaxed, such pressure can be implemented by a uniform tax
on emissions where they occur - combined with commodity  taxes satisfying the
optimality conditions for a traditional optimal tax problem without an environmental
good. The emission tax will then not only induce optimal abatement - reducing emission
coefficients in each activity -but also shift the economy optimally towards less polluting
activities, complementing a commodity  tax structure satisfying a formula that bear no
evidence of the externality. If monitoring costs are such as not to allow emission taxes,
but allow emission standards or abatement standards, then these standards combined with
commodity taxes that include presumptive Pigovian taxes (the structure given by
Sandmo, 1975) can implement the same allocation under favorable assumptions. This
scenario is the more general scenario in which we support our Mexico City analysis, with
the matching tax playing the role of the presumptive Pigovian part of the commodity tax
structure.
The examination allowed  us to shed light on other questions on the tour. Allowing
for differences across consumers in access to pollution control technology, results are of
two types. First, emission taxes, even though they are still first-best from an
environmental perspective, they take on additional roles in lieu of the planner's objectives
of revenue generation and redistribution. Second, without emission taxes, standards and
presumptive Pigovian taxes will display qualities of "imperfect corrective pricing". In this
case too, results under costly revenue generation  prove to be fairly intuitive extensions of
results developed under lump sum taxation.
a market good (say, gasoline), shall be valued at the producer price.26
A theme in our theoretical analysis is that environmental  protection is different
from government provided public goods only in the means of intervention, not in the
more basic optimality principles, such as the wedge between marginal costs and benefits.
This insight emerges now in the optimal tax model because we introduce abatement. This
means that, in a setting with two public goods, one which is a negative enviromnental
externality and another which is provided by government expenditure,  the optimality
conditions are the same. Intuition for this is given  by noting that the difference between
the two public goods in terms of revenue requirements  may be substantial, but at the
margin the relationships between additional  provision and government revenue are
identical. An area in which we benefit from this parallel is when we show that a question
in the double dividend debate boils down to an old question about Pigou's conjecture for
public expenditures. Pigou's conjecture applies directly, to reject the proposition of an
emission tax exceeding the marginal benefits.27
REFERENCES
Alberini, Anna, Winston Harrington and Virginia McConnell. 1995. "Determinants of
Participation in Accelerated Vehicle-retirement Programs." The Rand Journal of
Economics 26: 93-112.
Alfsen, Knut H. 1992. "Use of Macroeconomic Models in Analysis of Environmental
Problems in Norway, and Consequences for Environmental Statistics." Statistical
Journal of  the United  Nations 9:51-72.
Atkinson, Anthony B.  and Joseph E.  Stiglitz.  1980. Lectures on  Public Economics.
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York.
Atkinson, Anthony B.  and N.  H. Stern.  1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods."
Review of Economic Studies 41(1):1  19-128.
Auerbach, Alan, J.  1985.  "The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation." In
Handbook of Public Economics, edited by Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, Vol. 1,
Chap. 2, North-Holland,  New York.
Balcer, Yves. 1980. "Taxation of Externalities: Direct versus Indirect." Journal of Public
Economics 13:121-129.
Baurnol, William J. and Wallace E. Oates. 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy."
Cambridge University Press, New York, Sydney.
Bemdt, Ernst R. and G. Botero. 1985. "Energy Demand in the Transportation Sector of
Mexico."  Journal of Development Economics 17:219-38.
Bovenberg, A. Lans and F. van der Ploeg. 1994. "Environmental Policy, Public Finance
and the Labour Market in a Second-Best World." Journal of Public Economics
55:349-390.
Bovenberg,  A.  Lans  and  Ruud  A.  de  Mooij.  1994. "Environmental  Levies  and
Distortionary Taxation."  American Economic Review 84(4): 1085-1089.
Buchanan, J. M. and Gordon Tullock. 1975. " Polluters' Profit and Political Response:
Direct Controls Versus Taxes." American Economic Review 65:139-47, March.
Christiansen, Vidar.  1981. "Evaluation of  Public Projects under  Optimal  Taxation."
Review of Economic Studies XLVIII: 447-457.
Cremer, Helmuth, Firouz Gahvari and Norbert Ladoux. 1998. "Externalities and Optimal
Taxation." Journal of Public Economics 70: 343-364.28
Cremer, Helmuth and Firouz  Gahvari. 1999. "What to  Tax: Emissions  or Polluting
Goods?" University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,  Champaign, IL, February.
Cropper, M. L. and W. E. Oates. 1992. "Environmental Economics: A Survey." Journal
of Economic Literature 30:675-740.
Dasgupta, P. and J. Stiglitz. 1972. "On Optimal Taxation and Public Production." Review
of Economic Studies 39:87-103
Diamond, Peter A. 1973. "Consumption Externalities and Imperfect Corrective Pricing."
The Bell Journal  of Economics and Management Science  4(2):  526-538 (the
journal is now published as Rand Journal of Economics).
Diamond, Peter  A.  and  James  A.  Mirrlees.  1971.  "Optimal  Taxation  and  Public
Production I:  Production Efficiency."  American Economic Review 61(1): 8-27
and 61(3):261-278.
Eskeland, Gunnar S. 2000a. "Externalities and Production Efficiency." Earlier version as
Policy Research Working Paper Series, No. 2319. The World Bank, Washington,
D.C, April.
. 2000b.  "The Irrelevance  of the cost  of funds when  a public  good  -
such as the environment - benefits production." Development Research Group,
World Bank, Washington, D.C. Processed.
Eskeland, Gunnar S., E. Jimenez and L. Liu. 1998. "Prices that Clear the Air: Energy Use
and Pollution in Chile and Indonesia." The Energy Journal 19(3):85-106.
Eskeland, Gunnar S. and Tarhan N. Feyzioglu. 1997. "Is  demand for polluting goods
manageable: An econometric study of car ownership and use in Mexico." Journal
of Development Economics 53:423-445.
Eskeland, Gunnar S. and Tarhan N. Feyzioglu. 1997b. "Rationing Can Backfire: The
'Day without a Car'  in Mexico City." World Bank Economic Review 11(3):383-
408.
Eskeland, Gunnar and Shanta Devarajan.1996. Taxing Bads by Taxing Goods: Pollution
Control with Presumptive Charges. Directions in  Development series, World
Bank, Washington, D.C.
Eskeland, Gunnar S. 1994. "A Presumptive Pigovian Tax: Complementing Regulation to
Mimic an Emissions Fee." World  Bank Economic Review 8(3):373-394.
Eskeland, Gunnar S. and E. Jimenez. 1992. "Policy Instruments for Pollution Control in
Developing Countries." World Bank Research Observer 7(2):145-169.29
Fullerton, Don  and  Ann  Wolverton.  1999. "The  Case  for  a  Two-Part Instrument:
Presumptive Tax and Environmental Subisidy." In A. Panagariya, P. R. Portney
and  R. M. Schwab, editors, Environmental and Public Economics: Essays in
Honor of Wallace E. Oates, Cheltenham,  UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
Fuss, M. A. 1977. "The Demand for Energy in Canadian Manufacturing." Journal of
Econometrics 5:89-116.
Glomsrod, S., H. Vennemo and T. Johnsen. 1992. "Stabilization of Emissions of Carbon
Dioxide: A Computable General Equilibrium Assessment." Scandinavian Journal
of Economics 94(l):53-69.
Goulder, L. H., I. W. H. Parry, R. C. Williams III and D. Burtraw.  1999. "The  Cost-
Effectiveness of  Alternative  Instruments for  Environmental Protection  in  a
Second-Best  Setting." Journal of Public of Economics 72:329-360.
Greenwald, Bruce C. and Joseph E.  Stiglitz. 1986. "Externalities in Economies with
Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics
101(2):229-264.
Harrington, Winston. 1997. "Fuel Economy and Motor Vehicle Emissions." Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 33:240-252.
Hazilla, Michael and Raymond J. Kopp. 1990. "Social Cost of Environmental Quality
Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis." Journal  of Political Economy
98(4):853-73.
Innes, Robert. 1996. "Regulating Automobile Pollution under Certainty, Competition,
and  Imperfect  Information."  Journal  of  Environmental  Economics  and
Management 31(42):219-239.
Jorgenson, D.  W.  and P.  J. Wilcoxen. 1993. "Reducing US  Carbon Emissions: An
Econometric General Equilibrium Assessment."  Resource and Energy Economics
15:7-25.
King, Mervyn A. 1986. "A Pigovian Rule for the Optimum Provision of Public Goods."
Journal of Public Economics 30(3): 273-291.
Konrad,  K.  and  M.  Schroder.  1991. "An  Evaluation of  Taxes  on  Air  Pollutants
Emissions:  An  Applied  General  Equilibrium  Approach."  Swiss  Journal  of
Economics and Statistics 127(2):  199-224.
Magat,  W.  A.  and  W.  K.  Viscusi.  1990. "Effectiveness of  the  EPA's  Regulatory
Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards." Journal of Law and
Economics 33:331-360.30
Meade, J. E. 1952. "External Economies and Diseconomies in  a Competitive Situation."
The Economic Journal 62(245): 54-67.
Pigou, Arthur Cecil. 1932. "The Economics of Welfare." Macmillan & Co, London, 4th
edition (first edition was 1920).
Pindyck, R. 1979. The Structure of World  Energy Demand. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ramsey, F. P. 1927. "A Contribution to  the Theory of Taxation." Economic Journal
37(147):47-61.
Roberts, Marc  J. and Michael  Spence. 1976. "Effluent Charges and Licenses under
Uncertainty." Journal of Public Economics 5:193-208.
Samuelson, Paul A.  1954. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." Review of
Economics and Statistics 36(4): 387-389.
_.  1951. "Theory  of Optimal Taxation." Memorandum  to the U.S.
Treasury. Reprinted in Journal of Public Economics, 1986, 30:137-143.
Sandmo, Agnar. 1999. "Redistribution and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds." Journal
of Public Economics 70:365-382.
1976.  "Direct  versus  Indirect  Pigouvian  Taxation."  European
Economic Review 7:337-49.
1975.  "Optimal  Taxation  in the  Presence  of Externalities."  Swedish
Journal of Economics 77 (1): 86-98 (the journal is now published under the name
Scandinavian Journal of Economics).
____________  1974.  "A  Note  on  the  Structure  of  Optimal  Taxation."  American
Economic Review 64(4):701-706.
1972. "Optimality  Rules for the Provision of Collective  Factors of
Production."  Journal of Public  Economics I (1):149-157.
Schmutzler, Armin and Lawrence H. Goulder. 1997. "The Choice between Emission
Taxes and Output Taxes under Inperfect Monitoring."  Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 32:51-64.
Stiglitz, J. E. and Dasgupta, P. 1971. "Differential Taxation,  Public Goods and Economic
Efficiency." Review of Economic Studies 38(2):151-174.
Tiebout, Charles M. 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." Journal of Political
Economy 64:416-424.31
Tietenberg, Tom. 1992. "Environmental and Natural Resource Economics.3rd  ed."
HarperCollins Publishers, New York.
Weitzman, Martin L. 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities." Review of Economic Studies 41:477-
91.
Whalley, John and Randall Wigle.1998. "Cutting Carbon Dioxide Emissions: The Effects
of Alternative Policy Approaches." The Energy Journal 12(1):109-124.
Wijkander,  Hans. 1985.  "Correcting Externalities  through Taxes on/Subsidies to Related
Goods." Journal  of Public Economics  28:111-125.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2493  Annuity  Markets  in Comparative  Estelle  James  November  2000  A. Yaptenco
Perspective:  Do Consumers  Get  Dimitri  Vittas  31823
Their  Money's  Worth?
WPS2494  The Relevance  of Index  Funds  for  Ajay  Shah  November  2000  A. Yaptenco
Pension  Investment  in Equities  Kshama  Fernandes  31823
WPS2495  The  Australian  Annuity  Market  David  M. Knox  November  2000  A. Yaptenco
31823
WPS2496  Perspectives  on the Sources  of  Somik  V. Lall  November  2000  R. Yazigi
Heterogeneity  in Indian  Industry  G. Chris  Rodrigo  37176
WPS2497  State  Policies  and  Women's  Monica  Das  Gupta  November  2000  M. Das  Gupta
Autonomy  in China,  India,  and  the  Sunhwa  Lee  31983
Republic  of Korea,  1950-2000:  Patricia  Uberoi
Lessons  from Contrasting  Danning  Wang
Experiences  Lihong  Wang
Xiaodan  Zhang
WPS2498  Sustaining  Economic  Welfare:  Kirk  Hamilton  November  2000  L. Rivera
Estimating  Changes  in Per  Capita  82819
Wealth
WPS2499  The  Treatment  of Non-Essential  Isidro  Soloaga  December  2000  L.  Tabada
Inputs  in a Cobb-Douglas  Technology:  36896
An Application  to Mexican  Rural
Household-Level  Data
WPS2500 Investigating  Corruption  Canice Prendergast  December  2000  H. Sladovich
37698
WPS2501  Anti-Corruption  Policies  and  Jeff Huther  December  2000  A. Santos
Programs:  A Framework  for  Anwar  Shah  31675
Evaluation
WPS2502 Implications  of the Currency  Crisis  Masahiro  Kawai  December  2000  A. Azarcon
for Exchange  Rate  Arrangements  Shigeru  Akiyama  36049
in Emerging  East  Asia
WPS2503 Proposed  Strategy  for a Regional  Masahiro  Kawai  December  2000  A. Azarcon
Exchange  Rate  Arrangement  in  Shinji  Takagi  36049
Post-Crisis  East Asia
WPS2504  Social  Capital  and  the Quality  of  Stephen  Knack  December  2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Government:  Evidence  from the  38526
United  StatesPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2505  Family  Altruism  and Incentives  Roberta  Gatti  December  2000  R. Bonfield
31248
WPS2506  Ethnicity  and  Wage Determination  Abigail  Barr  December  2000  R. Bonfield
in Ghana  Abena  Oduro  31248
WPS2507  Public  Expenditures  and  Gunnar  S. Eskeland  December  2000  H. Sladovich
Environmental  Protection:  When Is  37698
the Cost  of Funds  Irrelevant?
WPS2508  Sources  of Financial  Assistance  for  Mattias  Lundberg  December  2000  V. Soukhanov
Households  Suffering  an Adult  Mead  Over  35271
Death  in Kagera,  Tanzania  Phare  Mujinja
WPS2509 How  Tax Policy  and Incentives  Jacques  Morisset  December  2000  N. Busjeet
Affect Foreign  Direct Investment:  Neda  Pirnia  33997
A Review